Systems for certifying sustainable resource use and decent labor conditions have become prominent modes of private regulation at the transnational level. But serious questions remain about how these global standards are translated into practice in particular places, especially in developing countries. Drawing on fieldwork in Indonesia, this paper examines the growth of certification of sustainable forestry (e.g., through the Forest Stewardship Council) and certification of decent labor conditions in factories (e.g., through Social Accountability International). Based on the controversy that surrounded both sweatshops and deforestation in Indonesia, and the export dependence of both the apparel/footwear and forest products sectors, these would appear to be prime candidates for the application of certification. Yet in both sectors, the growth of multi-stakeholder certification has been limited. Furthermore, private regulation in Indonesia has taken somewhat divergent paths in these two sectors, which shape certification's significance at the point of production. The paper examines how the socio-legal context of certification, supply chains, and possible differences in the politics of labor and the environment can help to explain these patterns and contribute to prying open the black box of implementation.
external pressures contributes to whether forest certification is supported in a particular country or not. 26 Espach's work perhaps goes furthest in explicitly linking the severity of external scrutiny and legitimacy crises to the growth of certification in particular countries. He argues that forest certification grew more in Brazil than in Argentina in part because in a national industry with as bad a reputation as Brazilian forestry, responsible firms must do everything they can to indicate their social and environmental responsibility. Since the 1970s, Brazil's national image has been tarred by images of ruthless deforestation and an uncaring government. This legacy places a mighty burden on companies that wish to legitimately sell products from the rainforest. They must differentiate themselves from a sea of nefarious, unethical competition and compete against the constant supply of cheap illegal wood.
Many firms ultimately view certification as critical for their public images, or to avoid scrutiny and criticism. 27 This dynamic is further fueled by the ineffectiveness of domestic government responses, such that -the legacy of decades of state ineffectiveness or indifference has had a strong positive influence on FSC effectiveness, though not in any way the government would have wished.‖ 28 The second major factor stressed throughout the existing literature involves the export dependence of industries and their position in supply chains. It is the increasing importance of export-oriented production in developing countries that creates the conditions for private regulatory initiatives to gain authority. 29 Furthermore, it is export-oriented sectors that have 26 Cashore, Auld and Newsom 2004 27 Espach 2009, 77 28 Espach 2009, 90 29 Gereffi, Garcia-Johnson and Sasser 2001; Seidman 2007; Vandergeest 2007 become subject to private regulatory initiatives, while those parts producing for domestic consumption have been relatively untouched by such efforts. 30 Going further, the degree of export dependence of particular sectors is expected to shape whether private regulatory systems take hold or not, since this is the mode through which international controversy is translated into market signals.
31
Cashore et al. show that export dependence shaped which regions and countries in Europe and North America had the most support from industrial forest companies for the FSC, 32 and Auld et al's review of the literature finds that -most work indicates that sending exports to Europe or North America increases the probability that an operation will certify.‖
33
Overdevest's comparison of Swedish and Finnish timber industries suggests that export dependence may even be sufficient to lead industry actors to upgrade their forest certification efforts, largely trumping other differences between national industries.
34
While some work has suggested additional factors-including the associational structure of industries and domestic policy agendas 35 -the literature as a whole speaks loudly and almost in unison regarding the crucial role of public controversy and export dependence. I therefore take these two key factors as a starting point for considering the growth of private regulation of forestry and labor in Indonesia. 30 See Amengual forthcoming; Gulbrandsen 2009. Gulbrandsen notes that since -most of the seafood in developing countries is consumed locally, in markets with little or no interest in ecolabeling, fisheries certification probably has limited potential to spread among the fisheries in these countries‖ (p.659). 31 Prakash and Potoski 2006 32 Cashore, Auld and Newsom 2004 33 Auld, Gulbrandsen and McDermott 2008, 195 34 Overdevest forthcoming 35 Auld, Gulbrandsen and McDermott 2008; Cashore, Auld and Newsom 2004; Espach 2009 
Controversy and Export Dependence in the Indonesian Forest Products Sector
By each of these criteria, the forest products and apparel/footwear industries in Indonesia would both appear to be ripe for the growth of certification. Both industries were the focus of intense external scrutiny and both are highly dependent on exports. In the remainder of this section, I describe the contours of this scrutiny and export dependence, starting with the case of forestry and then moving to apparel and footwear.
Indonesian forests have rapidly deteriorated over the past two decades. In general, as in the forest products industry, both public attention and export dependence would appear to make the Indonesian garment and footwear industries susceptible to and interested in international certification efforts. As prior analyses have argued, credible thirdparty certification should be an attractive option when firms face significant external scrutiny and occupy market positions that make them vulnerable to international pressures.
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The Status of Certification in Indonesia
Patterns of forest certification
While there are reasons to expect certification to become a prominent form of social and environmental governance in Indonesia, for the most part, it has not. In the case of forest certification, there are only nine FSC-certified forest management units in Indonesia (as of 2009), representing approximately 1.09 million hectares total. While this is not an insubstantial amount of land, it makes up but a small fraction of the country's roughly 100-120 million 69 One additional feature of the Indonesian garment industry potentially bodes well for advocates seeking to gain leverage for multi-stakeholder certification efforts: The garment industry does not have its own trade association (though the association for textile manufacturers does work with garment manufacturers to some degree). This lack of associational capacity should, by some accounts, decrease the industry's ability to fend off external challenges and thus increase its chances of acceding to pressure to cooperate with multi-stakeholder certification initiatives (Cashore et al. 2004 ).
hectares of total forest cover, more than half of which is designated by the government for -sustainable‖ production purposes. Gullison 2003 It is possible that low levels of certification could reflect the strict application of standards, and thus signal a type of success rather than failure of the FSC in Indonesia. It is true that FSC accredited auditors have refrained from granting outright -sham‖ certifications, and watchdog NGOs have kept a close eye out for such cases. Nevertheless, the evidence about auditing does not suggest an especially strict interpretation of compliance. In the absence of an FSC-endorsed national standard for Indonesia (discussed below), auditors must use their own standards, which increases their discretion in certification decisions. 74 My initial analysis of audit reports over time reveals that many of the changes that forest managers were required to make in order to get (or stay) certified were procedural rather than substantive, and many of the auditors' -corrective action requests‖ went unfulfilled. In some cases, unmet corrective action requests led auditors to suspend the certificate, as required by FSC rules, but in at least two cases (PT Erna Djuliawati and PT Intracawood), instances of repeated non-compliance appear to have been finessed by the auditors, allowing the company to keep its certificate.
It is also possible that the low level of certified forests could simply reflect a lack of demand for certified wood by the industries that process forest products. While it is difficult to assess this possibility fully, it is notable that while FSC certification of forest management units has been limited, there has been quite a lot of FSC -chain of custody‖ certification, which provides the users of certified wood with the ability to label their products as such. certified product using certified timber imported from the U.S. Others are hopeful that the supply of certified teak will increase soon, though as discussed in a later section, the decertification of Perum Perhutani forests makes this unlikely. Several larger firms that supply to IKEA are also among those with -chain of custody‖ certification, constituting a potentially important market driver. In general, a puzzle still remains as to why the supply of FSC certified timber has remained limited as the apparent demand for it (in the furniture sector at least) has increased. After reviewing patterns of certification in the labor standards case, I suggest some partial solutions to this puzzle.
Patterns of factory certification
Certification of factories with decent labor conditions has similarly had only a limited impact in Indonesia to date. The leading international, multi-stakeholder factory certificationSocial Accountability International's SA8000 standard-is in place for only 11 factories in sector, but less through third party certification than through the internal compliance activities of major brands. Many of the major brands producing in Indonesia-Nike, adidas, Disney-have sophisticated internal monitoring programs, supplemented in some cases by external audits done under the auspices of the Fair Labor Association, but they do not rely on external certification.
This flies in the face of a received wisdom that says that as claims and counter-claims about corporate social responsibility spiral, third party certification should become the dominant institutional arrangement for reestablishing credibility and trust. WRAP appears to have captured the market for brands that do not have a compliance office that directly oversees supplier factories. Given that third-party certification has become the norm in many other sectors (including forest products) and given theoretical arguments about its superior credibility in the eyes of consumers and retailers, the persistence of internal, firm-specific compliance activities in the garment and footwear sector is somewhat puzzling. This and other puzzles, both within and across the cases of labor and forestry, are taken up below.
Toward an Explanation
The preceding discussion has highlighted the puzzle of why both forest and labor standards certification are underdeveloped in Indonesia, relative to theoretical expectations.
Solving this puzzle in a comprehensive fashion is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, I
develop partial solutions by delving deeper into the practice of private regulation in each field, starting with forestry and moving to labor.
Forest Certification in an Unsettled Socio-Legal Environment
Why has forest certification remained so circumscribed in Indonesia? One barrier has to do with market demand, since although exports are crucial, the most common destinations for Indonesian forest products are Japan and China, where consumer and retailer demand for green products is very small. Still, given that some exports to China will be manufactured into products destined for U.S. and European markets (illustrated by the growth of -chain of custody‖ certification in China) and given that the U.S. and EU remain important export markets in themselves, especially for specialty furniture, the underdevelopment of green markets is only part of the solution to the puzzle, not the whole story.
The other important set of dynamics has to do with what appear to be deep conflicts between the logic of certification and the political economy of land use in Indonesia. Simply put, certification evaluates particular forest units, but in several respects, forest governance in Indonesia does not respect the integrity of such units. At the beginning of the New Order era (Suharto regime), the Indonesian state claimed essentially all forest land and remains responsible for granting concessions to manage it. The state has on one hand prioritized the clearing of forests for conversion to agriculture (especially acacia and oil palm plantations), leading to massive amounts of deforestation and forest degradation. But on the other hand, the state has encouraged the growth of industries with an insatiable appetite for timber and a reliance on natural forest concessions to feed that appetite-and when that is not enough, a reliance on illegal timber. Barr argues that this -structural timber deficit‖ has made a joke of the Indonesian the FSC has continued its operations there, the Perum Perhutani case partly explains why there is a disconnect between the capacity for processing certified forest products (i.e., -chain of custody‖ certification) and the actual supply of certified timber (i.e., forest management certification).
Finally, forest certification is complicated by the lack of an FSC-approved national standard for Indonesia. The FSC has a universal set of -Principles and Criteria,‖ but also develops more specific standards that operationalize these for particular countries or regions.
Despite two decades of experience with forest certification in Indonesia, no FSC-recognized national standard yet exists there. As a result, FSC-accredited certifiers must develop and rely on their own internal standards, giving greater discretion to auditors and arguably reducing the credibility of certification. The reasons for the lack of a national standard for Indonesia are complicated, but largely revolve around the shifting and somewhat uneasy relationship between the FSC and LEI, which was developed in 1993 as a response -from within Indonesia‖ to international scrutiny and certification efforts. 103 Due in large part to the leadership of former Environment Minister Emil Salim, LEI was less beholden to industry than many other domestically-driven certification efforts, which led to discussions between FSC and LEI about 101 In sum, Indonesia has proven a difficult setting for forest certification, due largely to the political economy of forestry and the ambiguous character of land tenure. These obstacles are not necessarily unique to Indonesia, but they do appear to be less tractable in this setting than in some others. Furthermore, there has been enough scrutiny of certification efforts themselvesfrom watchdogs both within and outside Indonesia-and enough transparency built into the FSC system, that the result has been stunted growth rather than the growth of sham certification.
Labor Standards through Multiple Mechanisms
The limited influence of certification in the labor standards arena in Indonesia is somewhat easier to explain. The question here is why multi-stakeholder, third-party certification has not won out over weaker, industry-driven certification on one hand or over firm-specific internal compliance activities on the other hand. I highlight two factors that can help make sense of this outcome.
First, the character of supply chains in the garment and footwear sectors appears to have facilitated the persistence of internal compliance and a low rate of reliance on third-party certification among brands with the greatest investments in CSR. largely taken a -low road,‖ and among those who might have supported a -high road,‖ one finds firm-specific compliance activities and activism geared more toward the state.
What might account for these different trajectories of standards and certification? First, there appear to be differences in the structure of supply chains in these sectors that are overlooked by the more typical strategy of emphasizing their similarities as -buyer-driven‖ commodity chains. In the apparel and footwear sector, brands and retailers have tended to rely on their own internal programs, but in forest products, they have more often privileged FSC certification (e.g., Home Depot, IKEA, and Kingfisher). 115 This could be a result of the greater role of apparel and footwear brands in directing the entire production process, including design and sourcing of supplies. It could also reflect activists making different kinds of demands of these lead firms. Future research might explore this issue by revisiting the question of precisely 114 Vogel 2005 115 In addition, the difference in the prominence of -high road‖ multi-stakeholder certification initiatives (i.e., FSC vs. SAI) may reflect differences in the transparency of certification in these sectors. The FSC publicly discloses more information about certified operations (such as detailed public summaries of audit reports) than SAI does, and the state of forests is more visible to external watchdogs than the state of particular factories. Partly for these reasons, the credibility of particular certifications has been more open to scrutiny in the forestry arena than in labor standards.
how a firm's reputation, supply chain position, and social movement pressure interact to generate a preference for a particular form of private regulation.
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In addition, the difference in the prominence of -high road‖ multi-stakeholder certification initiatives (i.e., FSC vs. SAI) may reflect differences in the transparency of these particular organizations. The FSC publicly discloses more information about certified operations (such as detailed public summaries of audit reports) than SAI does, and the state of forests is more visible to external watchdogs than the state of particular factories is. Partly for these reasons, the credibility of particular certifications has been more open to scrutiny in the forestry arena than in labor standards.
Finally, it is worth considering whether deep differences in the politics of labor and environmental issues might send certification initiatives down different paths. Distinctions between labor and environmental issues are often overstated. It is tempting to assume that -greening‖ is more technical, less -social,‖ and more efficiency-enhancing than are attempts to improve labor conditions. But this caricature overlooks the ways in which many environmental issues-especially forestry-are intertwined with communities, power, and social inequalities, Beyond these caricatures, there are several ways of thinking about potentially important differences in the politics of labor and environmental issues. For many scholars, this means thinking about the extent to which positive externalities associated with improved production practices flow to the public at large-that is, the extent to which certification systems generate public goods rather than only private benefits. 119 Of particular importance for certification systems is the extent to which broad benefits might flow to affluent consumers, such that their interest in buying a certified product goes beyond merely -warm glow‖ preferences 120 or the desire for political expression. 121 Improved air quality or reductions in global warming, for instance, might provide direct, albeit diffuse, benefits for consumers. The question, then, is whether sustainable forestry and fair labor are different in this regard. Forests' contribution to enhancing biodiversity and mitigating global warming do make them more in line with conventional analyses of public goods. On the other hand, if one believes that labor standards might generate not only private benefits for the covered workers but also outcomes like greater respect for rights or a leveling of destructive competition in international labor markets, then certification in this arena might conceivably generate public goods as well. These may flow primarily to other workers rather than to the public at large, but these categories should be almost completely overlapping. In short, it is clear that environmental problems have been more powerfully associated with a -common good‖ frame, but it is less clear if this is fully justified.
A more promising route would focus more on the historical development, ideologies, and strategies of labor and environmental movements in both domestic and transnational spheres. At the transnational level, the -compromise of liberal environmentalism,‖ whereby major Although independent trade unions exist-and have grown in number, if not in power, since democratization-they exist in the shadow of a national history that includes anti-communist purges and killings of union leaders (with a total death toll approximated at 500,000) in the wake of the 1965-66 attempted coup and rise of the Suharto regime. Further inquiry is needed to determine how this shapes domestic actors' power at the current time and their interest in various public and private regulatory arenas.
Conclusions
Research on private regulation has often left the implementation of standards in developing countries as something of a black box. Some assume that this black-boxed process works -as advertised,‖ while others assume that private regulation is not up to the task anywaymeaning that opening the black box would merely reveal a smokescreen. The reality of the -governance chain‖ is both more complex and more interesting than either of these stylized possibilities.
122 Bernstein 2001 123 Evans and Kay 2008; Obach 2004 The Indonesian case reminds us of the variety of factors that can limit the significance of private regulation at the point of production. While both the forest products and apparel/footwear sectors in Indonesia experienced high degrees of international controversy and export dependence, in neither sector did credible, third-party certification take hold as much as expected. In the forestry case, the FSC attracted a great deal of attention but fairly low levels of uptake, and concerns about its utility in the Indonesian context have persisted. In the labor standards case, SAI has been outpaced by the weaker WRAP system of certification, while many leading brands have continued to rely on internal compliance activities rather than turning to certification. These findings deserve systematic inquiry that can explain the overall limited significance of certification in Indonesia and unpack the differences across industries. Crossnational comparisons as well as further inquiry into failed or revoked certifications should be central to such work.
It is clear that an emphasis on controversy and export dependence-while an important start-is insufficient to explain the conditions under which multi-stakeholder systems take hold and influence conditions at the point of production. 
